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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND  
U.S. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN NATIONALS 
Jennifer K. Elsea* 
 
The due process rights of suspected terrorists have played a major role 
in the debate about how best to engage terrorist entities after September 11, 
2001.  Does citizenship or immigration status have a bearing on the 
treatment of terrorists?  Does location within or outside the United States 
matter?  This Article explores the connection between citizenship and 
alienage, enemy status, allegiance, and due process rights against a 
backdrop of international law.  It surveys the application of due process to 
citizens and aliens based on the location of misconduct within or outside 
the territory of the United States and notes the expansion of criminal law to 
cover ever more extraterritorial conduct, including that of noncitizens who 
otherwise have no connection to the United States. It concludes by 
suggesting that the fairness of a particular exercise of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction might be determined by looking at the nature of the 
obligation that a defendant owes to the state based on international law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Debates about the optimal approach to defeating terrorist organizations 
after September 11, 2001, have included some elements of discord 
regarding the rights of suspected terrorists—aliens as well as citizens—both 
inside the United States and abroad.  This Article explores the connection 
between citizenship and alienage, enemy status, allegiance, and due process 
rights.  It surveys the application of due process to citizens and aliens based 
on the location of misconduct within or outside the territory of the United 
States and notes the expansion of criminal law to cover ever more 
extraterritorial conduct, including that of noncitizens who otherwise have 
no connection to the United States.  Historically, citizenship has been 
thought of as the relationship of an individual to a sovereign government, 
encompassing the obligations of each to the other.  The citizen enjoyed the 
protection of the government and its laws in return for his allegiance and 
obedience to the laws.  The relationship between the state and aliens, on the 
other hand, was defined more in terms of obligations between the state and 
the alien’s home state. 
Citizenship (or nationality) was once seen as the essential link between 
individuals and the law of nations, because states—rather than 
individuals—were considered the subjects of international law, and it was 
only through the individual’s relationship to a state that he could enjoy any 
benefits under the law of nations.1  Statelessness was considered a 
substantial encumbrance; stateless individuals were essentially at the mercy 
of all states in whose territories they might find themselves, without the 
ability to call on the protection of a home state to obtain redress. 
The intertwined concepts of allegiance and protection were not, however, 
limited to citizens; there was also a territorial element stemming from the 
basic international rule that a state generally has the exclusive authority to 
regulate conduct in its territory.  Although they continued to owe allegiance 
to the native state, aliens in the territory of a host state owed “local 
allegiance” to the sovereign in return for the temporary protection of the 
laws of the land.  If the state on whose territory the alien resided denied him 
equal protection of the law, technically it would be in breach of its 
obligations toward the alien’s state of nationality rather than toward the 
alien himself.  As a practical matter, aliens could enjoy equal protection of 
the host state’s laws, making it potentially difficult to distinguish aliens 
from citizens in terms of rights they enjoyed or obligations they owed.  Of 
course, there was never any requirement under international law that aliens 
enjoy all of the privileges of citizens, such as the right to participate in 
government, for example.  International law may have been indifferent to 
the privileges that citizens and other categories of nationals enjoyed under 
domestic law, but it did operate to protect aliens from unfair treatment at the 
hands of local officials.2 
 
 1. 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 291 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). 
 2. Id. § 293. 
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This Article traces the historical incorporation of these international law 
concepts into domestic law, beginning with the development of due process 
for aliens of various classes in U.S. territory.  It then addresses the effect of 
war on the relationship of individuals to the United States, followed by a 
discussion of the development of due process rights extraterritorially.  
Finally, it surveys the expansion of U.S. criminal law to cover 
extraterritorial conduct. 
I.  DUE PROCESS FOR ALIENS ON U.S. TERRITORY 
That aliens in U.S. territory enjoy the protection of U.S. law is well 
established.  There was considerable discussion on the subject during the 
crisis and the Quasi-War involving the French Republic at the end of the 
eighteenth century.3  During the summer of 1798, Congress enacted a series 
of national security measures known collectively as the Alien and Sedition 
Acts,4 which included the Alien Act5 and the Sedition Act,6 as well as the 
Alien Enemy Act.7 
The Alien Act empowered the president to deport any noncitizen whom 
he judged to be “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States” or 
suspected to be engaged in any “treasonable or secret machinations” against 
the government.8  Expelled aliens convicted of having returned to the 
United States without a license were subject to imprisonment for such time 
as the president deemed necessary for the public safety.9  Outside of such a 
conviction, the Act did not permit summary detention, but the law was 
nonetheless controversial.  Part of the debate surrounding the Alien Act 
questioned the extent to which the Bill of Rights covers “alien friends” on 
U.S. territory.  Opponents argued that such aliens within the United States 
are entitled to due process of law and the same protection from the 
government as citizens.  Therefore, aliens suspected of being disposed to 
engage in plots to overthrow the social order or to take part in other 
insurrectionist activities10 should be tried in court rather than summarily 
deported.11 Proponents argued that aliens within the United States owed 
 
 3. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 52–54 (1996). 
 4. Congress also amended the Naturalization Act to extend the residency requirement 
from five to fourteen years. Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802).  For 
the text of the Alien and Sedition Acts and historical papers documenting the debates 
surrounding their passage, see Alien and Sedition Acts, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Alien.html. 
 5. Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800). 
 6. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801). 
 7. Alien Enemy Act, ch. 67, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (current version at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 21–24 (2006)). 
 8. Alien Act § 1, 1 Stat. at 571. 
 9. Id. § 2. 
 10. For a description of rumored plots that were cited in support of the legislation, see 
JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM:  THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 61–62 (1951). 
 11. The bill did not address preventive detention, except on conviction of returning 
without permission.  Some opponents of the bill nevertheless warned that its passage would 
inevitably lead to similar treatment of citizens who were suspected of being dangerous to 
national security. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1980–82 (1798). 
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merely temporary allegiance to the United States and were therefore not 
entitled to the same rights as citizens, and that all governments have the 
right to deport aliens who pose a danger.12  The bill passed along regional 
lines,13 but was never enforced, although some aliens left the country under 
their own volition.14  The Alien Act expired in 1800. 
The view that aliens on U.S. territory owe only a temporary allegiance to 
the United States, but nevertheless enjoy equal protection of the laws, 
appears to have prevailed.  That “persons” under the Fifth Amendment15 
includes citizens and aliens within the United States is well settled.16  While 
courts have sometimes suggested that only aliens with lawful permanent 
residence status are entitled to due process protection,17 the Supreme Court 
has in fact found that the Due Process Clause extends to all aliens within 
the United States, even those whose presence is “unlawful, involuntary, or 
transitory.”18  The level of process that is due varies according to the 
 
 12. See, e.g., 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533, 534 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, 2d ed. 1836) 
(response of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the Virginia Resolutions) (declaring the 
Alien and Sedition Acts to be constitutional and “expedient and necessary,” and asserting 
that the Alien Act “respects a description of persons whose rights were not particularly 
contemplated in the Constitution of the United States, who are entitled only to a temporary 
protection while they yield a temporary allegiance—a protection which ought to be 
withdrawn whenever they become ‘dangerous to the public safety’”). 
 13. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 53 (noting that support for the legislation came mainly 
from northern states).  Virginia and Kentucky passed resolutions declaring the Alien Act and 
the Sedition Act to be unconstitutional. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 12, at 528 (response of James 
Madison to the Virginia Resolutions of 1798); id. at 540–41 (Thomas Jefferson’s original 
draft of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799). 
 14. MILLER, supra note 10, at 188. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). 
 16. See generally 2 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 24:8 (3d ed. 
2013) (describing protection as it applies to aliens). 
 17. See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (“It is well 
established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains 
physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.”); see 
also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (explaining the view that 
constitutional rights extending to all “persons” or the “accused” apply universally to persons 
under U.S. jurisdiction, but other protections applicable to “the people” apply only to those 
who have developed significant ties to the United States). 
 18. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[O]nce an alien enters the country, 
the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within 
the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, 
temporary, or permanent.”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Wong Yang Sung v. 
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49–50 (1950); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (holding 
that no executive officer may “arbitrarily . . . cause an alien, who has entered the country, 
and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, 
although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving 
him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the 
United States”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that aliens may 
not be incarcerated as punishment for immigration violations without regular criminal 
process). 
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substantive right for which protection is sought, however, and such rights 
may vary according to citizenship and immigration status.19 
Aliens who have not acquired any domicile or residence in the United 
States are generally entitled to very little process to determine whether they 
should be permitted to enter the country.20  Although covered by the Due 
Process Clause, an alien seeking entry at a port of arrival is not 
constitutionally entitled to a judicial hearing, even if claiming to be a U.S.  
citizen.21  The distinction between due process protections accorded to 
“deportable,” compared to “excludable” aliens, for purposes of removal 
hearings, has thus traditionally been stark.22  Under the “entry fiction,” 
excludable (now called “inadmissible”) aliens are deemed to be standing at 
the border of U.S. territory,23 even if they have been paroled into the 
country24 or have previously been admitted to the United States and lived 
there many years.25  Deportable aliens are those who have entered the 
country but have become ineligible to remain.26  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that excludable aliens seeking entry into the United States are not 
entitled to the same due process prior to being removed that applies to 
aliens who have achieved entry.27  Whatever process Congress sees fit to 
 
 19. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 78 (“The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are 
protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are 
entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens 
must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification.”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally 
hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his 
identity with our society.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 722 (1987) (finding that aliens in the United States are entitled to 
due process of law and equal protection under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, although 
reasonable distinctions may be made between citizens and aliens). 
 20. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (upholding long-
term detention of aliens on Ellis Island seeking admission into the country); United States ex 
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (holding that aliens outside the country 
seeking admission are entitled to only that process determined by Congress to be due). 
 21. See generally United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905). 
 22. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 24–25 (1982) (explaining that U.S. immigration 
laws created two types of proceedings in which aliens could be removed from this country:  
deportation hearings for aliens who had entered the country and exclusion hearings for those 
seeking initial admission into the United States).  Aliens subject to deportation generally 
were granted greater substantive rights than excludable aliens. Id.  The Illegal Immigrant 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) changed the rules governing 
removal hearings. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
 23. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court concluded that the indefinite detention of 
deportable aliens would raise significant due process concerns, while distinguishing the case 
from one in which an excludable alien is subject to detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.  
The Court interpreted a statute governing the removal of deportable and inadmissible aliens 
as only permitting the detention of aliens following an order of removal for so long as is 
“reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Id. 
 24. Gisbert v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
excludable aliens may be subject to indefinite detention if their removal cannot be 
effectuated). 
 25. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213. 
 26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012). 
 27. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 
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provide to excludable aliens satisfies the Due Process Clause.28  It bears 
emphasis that it is Congress’s authority to admit aliens or exclude them, and 
the alien’s lack of a substantive right to be present in the United States, that 
brings about this distinction.  An excludable alien nevertheless has other 
life, liberty, or property interests with respect to which he would likely be 
accorded at least some due process.29  Further, he certainly could not be 
punished without the full benefits of a criminal trial.30 
II.  WARTIME TREATMENT OF CITIZENS AND ALIENS 
During periods of war, the obligations of individuals to their states of 
nationality take on greater importance.  Aliens acquire further status 
distinctions—that of alien friend or enemy, as well as civilian versus 
combatant. 
A.  Enemy Aliens 
The greatest historical distinction in terms of due process among citizens 
and classes of aliens in the United States arises in the context of war, in the 
treatment of enemy aliens—that is, citizens of a country with which the 
United States is at war.31  The Alien Enemy Act, unlike the Alien Act, 
engendered no disagreement in Congress when it was first enacted, and it is 
the only one of the Alien and Sedition Acts that remains on the books, 
practically unchanged.  The law of war permits the internment of enemy 
civilians and combatants and the confiscation of their property, regardless 
of whether the alien demonstrated any actual hostility.  Allegiance to the 
home country is simply presumed and, therefore, such detentions or 
confiscations serve the wartime aim of disabling the enemy.32  This rule has 
 
 28. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); United States 
v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905). 
 29. Cf. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The ‘entry fiction’ 
that excludable aliens are to be treated as if detained at the border despite their physical 
presence in the United States determines the aliens’ rights with regard to immigration and 
deportation proceedings.  It does not limit the right of excludable aliens detained within 
United States territory to humane treatment.”).  Arriving and excludable aliens are protected 
at least against conduct that “shocks the conscience.” See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 
F.3d 704, 731 (6th Cir. 2001) (dictum) (“[I]t would indeed shock the conscience to permit 
the INS to shoot or to torture a person seeking entry into the United States . . . .”), vacated on 
other grounds sub nom. Thomas v. Rosales-Garcia, 534 U.S. 1063 (2001); Wang v. Reno, 81 
F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that an alien paroled into the United States was included 
under the Fifth Amendment and protected from government conduct that “shock[s] the 
conscience”); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1272 (D. Utah 
2003) (holding that, even in the absence of Fourth Amendment restraints on law enforcement 
officers, previously removed alien felons will have protections against abusive police 
actions). 
 30. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
 31. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006). 
 32. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 772–73 (1950) (“The alien enemy is 
bound by an allegiance which commits him to lose no opportunity to forward the cause of 
our enemy; hence the United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards 
him as part of the enemy resources.  It therefore takes measures to disable him from 
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been ameliorated somewhat by treaty; alien enemies are to be given 
adequate time to depart the country upon the outbreak of war. 
International law formerly denied enemy aliens judicial standing, 
preventing their access to the courts.33  Although this is no longer the 
case,34 enemy aliens present in the United States may be interned35 or 
deprived of property by summary administrative proceeding.36  Interned 
aliens are entitled to contest their status as enemy aliens by means of habeas 
corpus.37  The Supreme Court found that an enemy alien may be deported 
without the ordinary due process accorded to noncitizens in deportation 
proceedings in the United States, even after hostilities have ended.38  In 
contrast, while the Supreme Court effectively permitted the wartime 
internment of U.S. citizens based on their Japanese descent,39 it also held 
that a concededly loyal U.S. citizen could not be detained in a relocation 
camp, which suggests that due process must be provided in order to permit 
such a detainee to contest disloyalty.40 
B.  Wartime Obligations of Citizens and Inhabitants 
War also affects the obligations of citizens and inhabitants, and not just 
by levying extra taxes or imposing conscription.  Belligerents have 
traditionally imposed on those under their jurisdiction the obligation to 
refrain from trade with enemy countries and persons, no matter how benign 
any particular transaction may seem.  Transactions intended to assist the 
enemy could expose those owing allegiance to the sovereign (even 
temporarily) to charges of aiding the enemy or even treason.  Like the 
internment of enemy persons and confiscation of enemy property, the 
prohibition of commerce is aimed at depriving the enemy of resources 
conducive to war. 
Arguably, a state of war in which hostilities take place within the United 
States eliminates due process rights of any enemy fighter, whether a foreign 
invader or a citizen who has taken up arms against the government during a 
 
commission of hostile acts imputed as his intention because they are a duty to his 
sovereign.”). 
 33. 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 100a. 
 34. Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942) (holding that an enemy alien was permitted to 
bring suit against an American company to claim unpaid wages); 2 OPPENHEIM’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 100a (explaining that this rule had virtually vanished 
by World War I). 
 35. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775. 
 36. Silesian Am. Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 475 (1947). 
 37. United States ex rel. De Cicco v. Longo, 46 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1942) (finding 
that internees have the right to habeas corpus to assert U.S. citizenship); see Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. at 775 (“Courts will entertain [an interned enemy alien’s] plea for freedom from 
Executive custody only to ascertain the existence of a state of war and whether he is an alien 
enemy and so subject to the Alien Enemy Act.”). 
 38. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). 
 39. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  The Court upheld a conviction for 
violating the exclusion order and did not address the citizen’s right to due process in 
connection with relocation or detention. Id. 
 40. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1943). 
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serious rebellion.41  With the exception of those who are associated with a 
foreign or breakaway government at war with the United States,42 the 
principle that war replaces civil law with military law has been historically 
limited to the actual scene of hostilities and areas that are declared hostile 
territory43 (e.g., states that joined the Confederacy during the Civil War) 
and does not extend to regions remote from hostilities where the civil 
government is not deposed.44 
The harsh consequences for wartime enemies may have been ameliorated 
in recent years, when the Supreme Court declined to extend the alien enemy 
doctrine, as described in Johnson v.  Eisentrager,45 to cover suspected 
enemy combatants (who are not technically enemy aliens) detained by the 
United States in an area subject to its jurisdiction overseas.46  Some lower 
courts were willing to permit detention of “enemy combatants” within the 
United States, whether citizens47 or aliens,48 without requiring much due 
 
 41. WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 513 (1912) (“[I]n war the enemy, be he a foreign one, or a rebel to whom the status 
of belligerent has been given, has no legal rights which those opposed to him must 
respect.”).  Occupying forces in hostile territory are likewise not subject to local civil laws. 
Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 165 (1879) (noting that when Union “armies marched into 
the country which acknowledged the authority of the Confederate government, that is, into 
the enemy’s country, their officers and soldiers were not subject to its laws, nor amenable to 
its tribunals for their acts”). 
 42. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (finding that even enemy belligerents within the 
United States, including both enemy aliens and a U.S. citizen, had a right to contest their 
status via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus). 
 43. See WILLOUGHBY, supra note 41, at 513. 
  When a civil contest becomes a public war, all persons living within limits 
declared to be hostile become ipso facto enemies, and subject to treatment as such. 
  Different conditions prevail, however, in loyal districts.  In these the existence 
of war does not operate to destroy or suspend the civil rights of the inhabitants. 
  Upon the actual scene of war, there is no question that, for the time being, the 
military authorities are supreme, and that these may do whatever may be necessary 
in order that the military operations which are being pursued may succeed. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 44. See id. at 514–15 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)); see also 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121, 139–42 (rejecting the government’s contention that the 
president’s determination as to the region of military operations was conclusive); CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 108-17, at 342 (2004) (“Military law to the exclusion of 
constitutional limitations otherwise applicable is the rule in the areas in which military 
operations are taking place.”). 
 45. 339 U.S. 763, 782 (1950) (rejecting the contention that nonresident enemy aliens 
engaged in hostilities against the United States were “persons” within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment and had the right to access the courts to petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus). 
 46. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
Similarly, an alien designated for sanctions as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” is 
able to contest such designation as a violation of due process so long as the alien has 
sufficient presence in the United States. See, e.g., Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64 
(D.D.C. 2008) (finding that an alien had sufficient contacts to have standing to argue a Fifth 
Amendment claim, but the claim was dismissed because the plaintiff had received notice and 
an opportunity to be heard). 
 47. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y.) (rejecting 
the notion that a citizen suspected of being an “enemy combatant” was entitled to no due 
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process, but the Supreme Court has not validated this view.  A Court 
plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld rejected the notion that a citizen 
captured on the battlefield can be detained without due process,49 while at 
the same time suggesting that the process due to such a citizen might fall 
short of procedures accorded at a criminal trial.50  Despite the plurality’s 
repeated reference to the fact that the petitioner was a U.S. citizen detained 
on U.S. soil, lower courts have applied its due process reasoning in cases 
 
process, but finding that due process requires only that the government present “some 
evidence” in support of the allegation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Padilla v. 
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).  The government in that 
case sought to deny the petitioner, a U.S. citizen, the ability to meet with counsel in order to 
present factual evidence to rebut the allegations.  The judge ordered otherwise.  From there, 
the case took a course that brought it before two circuit courts and the Supreme Court, but it 
was never resolved definitively on the merits. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 
(E.D. Va. 2002) (finding that a U.S. citizen captured abroad and held as an “enemy 
combatant” is entitled to due process of law, which was not satisfied by a government 
declaration standing alone, but suggesting that the declaration was deficient in some respects 
and might otherwise have sufficed), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004).  The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that no factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing 
was necessary to sustain the government’s authority to detain the citizen under these 
circumstances. Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450. 
 48. See Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006), rev’d en 
banc sub nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (mem.); Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. 
Supp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2005) (denying summary judgment and distinguishing between citizen 
and alien enemy combatants).  In Al-Marri ex. rel. Berman v. Wright, the district court held 
that the government had satisfied its burden of proving the detainee to be an enemy 
combatant by submitting an affidavit based on hearsay.  The appellate court, sitting en banc, 
was sharply divided, but the controlling opinion remanded the case for a factual 
determination using a higher level of due process than had been initially adopted by the 
district court or was urged by the government.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but the 
case was made moot when the government transferred al-Marri to the criminal court system 
for prosecution. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 555 U.S. 1066 (2008). 
 49. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) (stating that due process 
requires that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair 
opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker”); 
id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring in part). 
 50. Justice O’Connor wrote in Hamdi that the exigencies of the circumstances may 
allow for a tailoring of enemy combatant proceedings “to alleviate their uncommon potential 
to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict,” possibly allowing hearsay 
evidence and “a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence,” as long as a fair 
opportunity to rebut such evidence is provided. Id. at 533–34 (O’Connor, J.) (plurality 
opinion).  Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed that Hamdi was entitled to due 
process, including the right to counsel, but did not agree with the suggestion that “the 
Government could claim an evidentiary presumption casting the burden of rebuttal on 
Hamdi, or that an opportunity to litigate before a military tribunal might obviate or truncate 
enquiry by a court on habeas.” Id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (citations 
omitted).  Justices Scalia and Stevens would have found the full trappings of a criminal trial 
necessary in the absence of a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and in any event, did 
not believe the Court should engage in legislating alternative procedures. Id. at 554, 576 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas alone would have accepted the government’s view 
that it need only show “some evidence” in order to establish that detention is warranted, 
arguing that the federal government’s war powers cannot be “balanced away by this Court” 
and that only Congress should be able to “provide for additional procedural protections.” Id. 
at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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involving aliens alleged to be enemy belligerents, both within the United 
States and abroad.51 
III.  EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE  
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Many once thought that the Constitution applied only on U.S. territory, at 
least the parts of it that set forth the rights of the governed.52  That strictly 
territorial understanding has not been static, however, and may yet be 
evolving. 
Any inquiry into the status of constitutional rights abroad must start with 
the Insular Cases,53 in which the Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth 
century examined the application of the Constitution on newly acquired 
territories and possessions.  The crucial distinction was whether the territory 
in question was destined to be incorporated as a state in the Union or 
whether U.S. sovereignty there was meant to be temporary.54  In the latter 
case, the territory was deemed “unincorporated” and only “fundamental” 
constitutional rights attached.55  Although the reasoning for the incomplete 
attachment of constitutional rights to unincorporated territories had much to 
do with what were viewed as the less developed political societies formed 
by the native inhabitants of these territories,56 the failure to extend 
constitutional rights affected U.S. citizens present in the territories as much 
as it did the noncitizen inhabitants.57 
Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have emerged on the matter of 
the extraterritorial application of the Constitution.  According to one view, 
the United States is considered a limited government that derives its 
existence and all of its powers from the Constitution.58  It would follow that 
 
 51. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 2741 (2012); In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 465 (D.D.C. 
2005), vacated by Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 52. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (holding that the constitutional right to indictment, 
grand jury, or jury trial do not apply to a U.S. citizen tried by a U.S. consular court abroad); 
see KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?:  THE EVOLUTION OF 
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 85 (2009) (describing the legal landscape at the 
beginning of the twentieth century as one in which some questioned why “all of the powers, 
but only some of the rights” under the Constitution extended to U.S. territories overseas that 
were not destined to join the union as a state). 
 53. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 
(1914); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 
U.S. 516 (1905); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195 
U.S. 100 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. 
United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huus v. 
New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 
U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 
U.S. 221 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). 
 54. Downes, 182 U.S. at 271. 
 55. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 144–148; see RAUSTIALA, supra note 52, at 83–86 (describing the 
doctrine of incorporation). 
 56. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 958–62 (1991). 
 57. Id. at 943. 
 58. See NEUMAN, supra note 3, at 6. 
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the Constitution “follows the flag”; whenever or wherever these powers are 
exercised, they are subject to all of the limitations contained in the 
Constitution.59  A second school of thought regards the Constitution as a 
“social contract” between the government and the governed, in which it is 
emphasized that certain rights pertain to “the people” but do not extend 
beyond members of the exclusive community.60 
A.  Citizens Abroad 
In 1891, the Supreme Court stated in In re Ross: 
By the constitution a government is ordained and established “for the 
United States of America,” and not for countries outside of their limits.  
The guaranties it affords against accusation of capital or infamous crimes, 
except by indictment or presentment by a grand jury, and for an impartial 
trial by a jury when thus accused, apply only to citizens and others within 
the United States, or who are brought there for trial for alleged offenses 
committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners 
abroad.  The constitution can have no operation in another country.61 
Thus, up until the World War II era, American citizens could be tried 
overseas by a consular or extraterritorial court,62 or, in areas subject to 
military occupation, by military tribunal,63 apparently without the ordinary 
constitutional provisions guaranteed in criminal trials.64 
 
 59. The four dissenting justices in the Downes v. Bidwell case, the first of the Insular 
Cases, took this view. Downes, 182 U.S. at 358 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
 60. See Neuman, supra note 56, at 913. 
 61. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (citation omitted).  The writ of habeas corpus 
was nevertheless available, and the case was not one in which a person was punished without 
any process at all. Id. 
 62. The United States created extraterritorial courts through treaties with trade partners, 
who were regarded as having less civilized legal systems, in order to gain access to foreign 
societies without subjecting American traders to the risk of what were perceived as barbaric 
and unfair trials. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 52, at 20–21.  Although the consular courts 
were for the most part disbanded by the time the U.S. District Court for China was 
established in 1906, that court continued to consider Ross controlling as to the constitutional 
rights that defendants could assert before it. Id. at 68–71.  The U.S. District Court for China 
was abolished in 1943 pursuant to a treaty with China. Treaty and an Accompanying 
Exchange of Notes Between the United States of America and China Respecting the 
Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, 
U.S.-China, art. 1, Jan. 11, 1943, 57 Stat. 767.  The United States finally relinquished all 
claims to consular jurisdiction in 1956, by which time the consulate in Morocco was the only 
one that continued to exercise consular jurisdiction over Americans. Joint Resolution 
Approving the Relinquishments of the Consular Jurisdiction of the United States in 
Morocco, U.S.-Morocco, Aug. 1, 1956, 70 Stat. 773. 
 63. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). 
 64. Id. at 359, 360 n.26 (describing due process protections in occupation courts, 
suggesting that the Fifth Amendment’s inapplicability to cases arising in the land or naval 
forces led to a difference in protections); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901) (finding 
that a U.S. citizen to be tried in Cuba under U.S. military occupation was not entitled to 
“fundamental guaranties of life, liberty, and property embodied in [the Constitution] . . . 
[because] those provisions have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of 
the United States against the laws of a foreign country,” although that foreign country was 
under U.S. military occupation at the time). 
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A series of Supreme Court cases in the 1950s cast considerable doubt on 
that proposition, although the Court did not expressly overrule the line of 
cases supporting it.65  In Reid v. Covert,66 the Court reversed its own 
opinions from the previous term67 and overturned the convictions of two 
civilian wives of military officers who were tried by military tribunals 
overseas for their husbands’ murders.  Justice Black wrote for himself and 
three others: 
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts 
against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.  The United 
States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its power and authority 
have no other source.  It can only act in accordance with all the limitations 
imposed by the Constitution.  When the Government reaches out to 
punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and 
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty 
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another 
land.68 
The opinion established that civilians could not be tried for capital crimes 
without the full panoply of due process standards guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights, at least outside of areas of ongoing military operations or 
occupation.69  The holding was soon expanded to cover noncapital cases 
and crimes involving civilian employees of the armed services.70  Due 
 
 65. In Reid v. Covert, Justice Black, writing for a plurality, considered Ross to be “one 
of those cases that cannot be understood except in its peculiar setting; even then, it seems 
highly unlikely that a similar result would be reached today.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 
(1957) (Black, J.) (plurality opinion).  He distinguished Madsen on the basis that it 
“concerned trials in enemy territory which had been conquered and held by force of arms 
and which was being governed at the time by our military forces.  In such areas, the Army 
commander can establish military or civilian commissions as an arm of the occupation to try 
everyone in the occupied area, whether they are connected with the Army or not.” Id. at 35 
n.63.  Justice Black also suggested that “neither the [Insular Cases] nor their reasoning 
should be given any further expansion.” Id. at 14. 
 66. 354 U.S. 1. 
 67. Id. at 5 (withdrawing opinions in Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956), and Reid 
v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956)). Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the result.  
Justice Harlan described the reasoning in those two cases as holding that the government’s 
choice of court-martial to try the women satisfied due process because it was “reasonable” in 
light of their connection with the military. Id. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. at 5–6 (Black, J.) (plurality opinion). 
 69. Id. at 35 n.63 (distinguishing Madsen based on the circumstances of military 
occupation).  Reid invalidated Article 2(a)(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2012), which brought under the purview of 
military jurisdiction civilians accompanying the armed forces outside of the United States or 
its territories subject to treaty with the host country.  Article 2(10) of the UCMJ covers 
“persons serving with or accompanying” the armed forces in the field “in time of declared 
war or a contingency operation.” 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).  This provision remains good law, 
although the reasoning in Reid may call it into question, at least with respect to citizens. See 
United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (finding that an alien contractor working 
for the U.S. government was not entitled to avoid a military trial under the Fifth 
Amendment), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2338 (2013). 
 70. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (extending Reid to 
prohibit court martial of a civilian employee of the Army for a noncapital offense); Grisham 
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (extending Reid to prohibit court martial of a civilian 
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process rights under the Fifth Amendment clearly now seem applicable to 
U.S. citizens abroad.71 
B.  Aliens Abroad 
Based on Supreme Court statements suggesting that aliens gain 
constitutional rights upon entering the country and thereafter forming a link 
with the community, one might conclude that aliens abroad enjoy no 
constitutional protections.  Yet the Supreme Court has never squarely 
affirmed that this is the case.72  In at least one sense, foreign nationals with 
no connection to the United States are protected by due process; they 
cannot be subject to lawsuits in a state in which they have not formed 
“minimum contacts” by purposefully directing activity toward it.73  There 
may be due process implications when the United States asserts jurisdiction 
over aliens for conduct abroad that has little or no effect on the United 
States.74  It has never been held that aliens brought involuntarily to the 
United States for criminal trial may be denied due process of law because of 
their lack of positive connections with the United States.  In one case 
involving an alien tried by a U.S. court in Berlin, the defendant was held to 
be entitled to a jury trial and other constitutional rights.75  Aliens not 
subjected to the U.S. judicial system involuntarily, however, have had little 
success bringing suit against the United States for injuries suffered 
overseas.76 
 
employee of the Army for a capital offense); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 
U.S. 234 (1960) (applying Reid to a noncapital case involving a civilian dependent). 
 71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 721 cmt. b (1987) (“The Constitution governs the exercise of authority by the United 
States government over United States citizens outside United States territory, for example on 
the high seas, and even on foreign soil.”).  U.S. citizens are not, however, protected from 
being transferred to a foreign government for trial, even if that government does not apply 
the same procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 
U.S. 674 (2008); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901). 
 72. But see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 
(1950)); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 (“Indeed, we have rejected the claim that aliens 
are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States.”). 
 73. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (holding that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires due process on the part of 
states, is violated by a state court asserting jurisdiction over a foreign defendant lacking 
minimum contacts with the forum state).  Arguably, the due process right at issue applies at 
trial in the United States and does not actually extend abroad. RAUSTIALA, supra note 52, at 
245–46. 
 74. See infra Part IV; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-166, 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 5 (2012). 
 75. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979). 
 76. See Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152 (D.D.C. 1976) 
(citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776, among other cases) (stating the general rule that aliens 
have no standing to sue in U.S. courts and naming three exceptions).  A later ruling by the 
D.C. Circuit called this decision into question. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 
65–68 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated by 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (vacating in light of 
intervening case law on the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort Statute from Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)); see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. 
United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that the owners of a chemical plant 
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In Johnson v. Eisentrager,77 the Supreme Court addressed whether alien 
enemies captured abroad and held in U.S.-occupied territory overseas could 
challenge their convictions by military commission.  Reversing the 
appellate court below, the Court held that “the Constitution does not confer 
a right of personal security or an immunity from military trial and 
punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a 
government at war with the United States.”78  In so holding, the Court 
rejected the lower court’s extension of constitutional protections to 
nonresident alien enemies that were denied to resident alien enemies,79 and 
remarked: 
If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world except 
Americans engaged in defending it, the same must be true of the 
companion civil-rights Amendments, for none of them is limited by its 
express terms, territorially or as to persons.  Such a construction would 
mean that during military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements, 
guerrilla fighters, and “werewolves” could require the American Judiciary 
to assure them freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in the First 
Amendment, right to bear arms as in the Second, security against 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures as in the Fourth, as well as rights to 
jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.80 
Still, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Reid less than a decade later 
seemed to reject the strictly territorial theory of the Constitution in favor of 
one in which executive branch officials operate under constitutional 
restraints even when operating overseas.  Although the justices were careful 
to limit their opinions to action taken against U.S. citizens abroad, none 
endeavored to clarify why U.S. officials should operate under fewer 
constitutional restraints with respect to aliens.  Some lower courts have 
applied the Reid reasoning to cases involving aliens abroad,81 construing 
Eisentrager as limited to wartime enemies.82 
 
destroyed due to a suspected connection with a terrorist organization were barred from 
seeking compensation by the political question doctrine); Atamirzayeva v. United States, 
524 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that an Uzbek citizen whose cafeteria was destroyed 
at the behest of the U.S. government lacked significant ties to the United States and thus had 
no standing to bring a case under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 77. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 78. Id. at 785. 
 79. Id. at 784. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Cadenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that an alien overseas 
was entitled to challenge governmental interference with her property); United States v. 
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that an alien had standing to bring 
constitutional claims with respect to U.S. government conduct abroad), abrogated by United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 82. See, e.g., Cadenas, 733 F.2d at 915 (“It is beyond peradventure that a foreign 
nonresident, non-hostile alien may, under some circumstances, enjoy the benefits of certain 
constitutional limitations imposed on United States actions.”).  The D.C. Circuit 
distinguished Eisentrager as having to do with “rights of aliens during periods of war 
involv[ing] considerations not present here.” Id. at 916. 
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Pointing in the opposite direction is the 1990 case United States v.  
Verdugo-Urquidez,83 in which the Supreme Court addressed the Fourth 
Amendment rights of aliens abroad.  In determining that such rights do not 
apply to aliens lacking significant ties to the United States for searches or 
seizures that take place abroad (even if the alien himself is present within 
the United States), the majority distinguished between Fourth Amendment 
rights, which apply to “the people,” and other amendments that apply to 
“persons,” like the Fifth Amendment.84  Chief Justice Rehnquist applied a 
social contract theory to reason that the “the people” refers to “a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of 
that community.”85  At the same time, the majority suggested that Fifth 
Amendment rights do not apply to aliens extraterritorially.86  Although he 
joined the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy appeared to disagree with the 
view that aliens abroad are necessarily denied due process rights, pointing 
out that aliens subject to trial in the United States are entitled to due 
process, even if they were brought from overseas involuntarily.87  In 
dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the defendant should be entitled to the 
Fourth Amendment protections because of involuntary ties, as the 
government sought to hold him accountable under U.S. law.88 
In the 2008 case Boumediene v. Bush,89 the Court ruled, in a five-to-four 
opinion, that the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus extends to those 
detained at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility.90  In so holding, the 
 
 83. 494 U.S. 259. 
 84. Id. at 265. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 268–71 (describing Eisentrager as having rejected “the claim that aliens are 
entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States”). 
 87. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I do not mean to imply, and the Court has not 
decided, that [aliens brought from overseas to stand trial] have no constitutional protection. 
The United States is prosecuting a foreign national in a court established under Article III, 
and all of the trial proceedings are governed by the Constitution.  All would agree, for 
instance, that the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the 
defendant.”).  The majority distinguished the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination as a trial right, while a Fourth Amendment violation occurs at the scene of an 
unreasonable search or seizure. Id. at 264 (Rehnquist, C.J.). 
 88. Id. at 284–85 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (emphasizing mutuality of 
obligations as essential to fairness).  Justice Brennan further noted that: 
The “sufficient connection” is supplied not by Verdugo-Urquidez, but by the 
Government.  Respondent is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
because our Government, by investigating him and attempting to hold him 
accountable under United States criminal laws, has treated him as a member of our 
community for purposes of enforcing our laws.  He has become, quite literally, one 
of the governed.  Fundamental fairness and the ideals underlying our Bill of Rights 
compel the conclusion that when we impose “societal obligations,” such as the 
obligation to comply with our criminal laws, on foreign nationals, we in turn are 
obliged to respect certain correlative rights, among them the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 283–84 (citations omitted); see also id. at 297–98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (agreeing 
with Justice Brennan’s dissent, but disassociating from that opinion insofar as it applied to a 
broader context beyond the exercise of sovereign authority over aliens). 
 89. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 90. Id. at 732. 
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Court stated that the Constitution’s extraterritorial application turns on 
“objective factors and practical concerns.”91  These practical considerations 
were seen as a common thread weaving from the Insular Cases, through 
Ross, to Eisentrager and Reid.92  The Court rejected the government’s 
formalist interpretation of Eisentrager under which the question of habeas 
jurisdiction was said to turn on whether the detainees were held in a 
territory over which the United States was sovereign.93  It was enough that 
the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction and control over the naval 
base. 
The Court deemed at least three factors relevant in assessing the 
extraterritorial scope of the constitutional writ of habeas:  (1) the citizenship 
and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the status determination 
process; (2) the nature of the site where the person is seized and detained; 
and (3) practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to 
the writ.94  Although the Court did not clarify which constitutional rights 
other than the privilege of habeas corpus would extend to the detainees, the 
first factor suggests that at least some aliens detained abroad have due 
process rights.95  Otherwise, they would have no right to a status 
determination process in the first place.96 
Lower courts have interpreted the above cases as affording constitutional 
due process rights to aliens abroad only to the extent that they have formed 
sufficient positive ties with the United States.97  The D.C. Circuit has 
 
 91. Id. at 764. 
 92. Id. at 756–64.  The majority was also troubled by the separation-of-powers 
implications that the government’s approach created, which it said would mean “that by 
surrendering formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a third party, while at 
the same time entering into a lease that grants total control over the territory back to the 
United States, it would be possible for the political branches to govern without legal 
constraint.” Id. at 765. 
 93. Guantánamo Bay is held by the United States under a lease between the United 
States and Cuba, which states “Cuba retains ‘ultimate sovereignty’ over the territory while 
the United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control.’” Id. at 753 (quoting Lease of 
Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, Art. III, T.S. No. 418). 
 94. Id. at 766. 
 95. Cf. id. at 781 (“The idea that the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends 
upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings accords with our test for procedural adequacy in 
the due process context.”); id. at 785 (“Although we make no judgment whether the 
[procedures used at Guantánamo to ascertain the status of detainees], satisfy due process 
standards, we agree . . . that, even when all the parties involved in this process act with 
diligence and in good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of 
fact.”). 
 96. But see Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that detainees at a 
U.S.-controlled prison in a war zone were not entitled to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
notwithstanding the fact that procedures for establishing belligerent status fell short of those 
found insufficient in Boumediene). 
 97. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that an alien who voluntarily departed from the United States with the intention to return to 
continue her studies had developed sufficient ties to the country to assert a due process 
violation against the government agency that prevented her return by placing her name on a 
“no-fly” list); Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that 
an alien with no substantial connection to the United States has no right to assert a Fifth 
Amendment takings claim for property destroyed overseas); Hoffmann v. United States, 17 
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maintained that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to aliens or foreign 
entities without presence or property in the United States,98 unless the alien 
or entity is forced to defend itself in a U.S. court.99  At least one appellate 
court has suggested that Boumediene may apply a functional approach to all 
cases in which an alien asserts an extraterritorial constitutional violation, 
including alleged violations of the Due Process Clause,100 while others have 
limited Boumediene’s application to the Suspension Clause.101 
IV.  EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW 
Early in U.S. history, criminal laws were, for the most part, territorial.102  
Criminal laws applied to conduct taking place, at least in part, in the 
territory of the United States or having some territorial effect.  A 
presumption remains against extraterritoriality for criminal laws in cases 
where Congress does not express its intent,103 but a surprising number of 
 
F. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that a foreign national who failed to establish 
substantial connections to the United States could not maintain takings claim against the 
United States for failure to return artwork taken from Germany during the allied occupation 
after World War II). 
 98. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that the Fifth 
Amendment has not been clearly established as prohibiting torture of aliens detained by the 
United States during hostilities overseas, resulting in qualified immunity for alleged 
torturers); Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (determining that 
noncitizen detainees wrongfully held at Guantánamo lacked significant ties to the United 
States and were not protected by the Due Process Clause), vacated and remanded per 
curiam, 559 U.S. 131 (2010), reinstated as modified per curiam, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 
2010); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that Guantánamo 
detainees are not entitled to Fifth Amendment protections); 32 Cnty. Sovereignty Comm. v. 
Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that a foreign entity wishing to 
challenge its designation as a “foreign terrorist organization” is not entitled to due process 
rights); Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that a Guatemalan 
citizen allegedly tortured and murdered by CIA affiliates abroad was not entitled to Fifth 
Amendment rights), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 
(2002); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (“A foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional 
rights, under the due process clause or otherwise.”). 
 99. GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[S]ince [the 
foreign corporation] has been forced to appear in the United States, at least for that limited 
purpose, it is entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause.” (footnote omitted)). 
 100. Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 997 (rejecting the government’s proposed “bright-line ‘formal 
sovereignty-based test’” under which “any alien, no matter how great her voluntary 
connection with the United States, immediately loses all constitutional rights as soon as she 
voluntarily leaves the country”). 
 101. El Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 848–49  (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(distinguishing the Suspension Clause from others in that it describes a role for the 
judiciary); Rasul, 563 F.3d at 531; Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546 (2010) (finding that 
Boumediene does not apply to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause). 
 102. United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 16,317) 
(“Except in [certain cases where Congress has provided for jurisdiction in foreign territory], 
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States is necessarily limited to their own territory, 
actual or constructive.”); cf. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) 
(“The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful 
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”). 
 103. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (“It is a 
longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent 
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criminal statutes now expressly extend to conduct overseas.104 The 
presumption may also be overcome if the nature and purpose of a statute 
indicate that Congress intended it to apply outside of the United States.105 
At first, the extension of criminal jurisdiction overseas was largely 
limited to the conduct of citizens abroad under the “nationality” principle of 
jurisdiction under international law, the constitutionality of which was 
never in doubt.106  Increasingly, however, jurisdiction over conduct 
overseas has found additional support through the principles of “passive 
personality” and “protection,” where the victim is a national of the United 
States or the crime affects U.S. national interests, respectively, even though 
the perpetrator may be a foreign national.  The “universality principle” 
permits extraterritorial jurisdiction over offenses that are considered to 
affect all nations, such as piracy.  In some instances, consistent with our 
treaty obligations, jurisdiction may be founded solely on the fact that a 
suspect is later found or brought into the territorial jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts, without the crime necessarily having any connection to or effect in 
the United States.107 
Under the United States’ view of the international legal requirements, the 
exercise of jurisdiction over an offense that occurs in the territory of another 
state must be “reasonable.”108  The most commonly invoked constitutional 
ground for determining the validity of an exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in the criminal context, however, is the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.  A small number of defendants have succeeded in 
 
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’  This 
principle represents a canon of construction, or a presumption about a statute’s meaning, 
rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil 
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))). 
 104. See Doyle, supra note 74 (cataloging criminal statutes with extraterritorial 
application). 
 105. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
 106. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (“With respect to such an 
exercise of authority, there is no question of international law, but solely of the purport of the 
municipal law which establishes the duties of the citizen in relation to his own government.  
While the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is construed to 
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the question of its 
application, so far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries are concerned, is one 
of construction, not of legislative power.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 107. Some crimes related to terrorism fall into this category. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32 
(2012) (stating that the willful destruction of registered U.S. aircraft in foreign territory is 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction); id. § 831 (stating that a foreign transaction of nuclear materials 
implicating U.S. interests is subject to U.S. jurisdiction); id. § 1203 (stating that taking U.S. 
nationals hostage in a foreign country creates U.S. jurisdiction). 
 108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 403(1) (1987) (“[A] state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a 
person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such 
jurisdiction is unreasonable.”).  Other states may take a different view. See Dan E. Stigall, 
International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. 
Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 342 (2012) (noting that the 
“reasonableness” test seems to be “almost exclusively a creature of U.S. antitrust 
jurisprudence”). 
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having their cases dismissed on this basis,109 or because statutes are 
interpreted, under the Charming Betsy doctrine,110 in such a way as to 
comply with international law.111  On the other hand, where Congress has 
explicitly provided for extraterritorial application of criminal statutes, 
courts do not question whether such provisions exceed any standard under 
international law.112 
Some of the circuit courts have developed varying tests for determining 
when an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction violates due process.  The 
Ninth Circuit requires a nexus between the United States and the 
circumstances of the offense,113 without which a prosecution may be 
deemed arbitrary or unfair.114  No such nexus requirement need be met, 
however, if the offenders were arrested on a stateless vessel on the high 
seas, apparently due to the absence of comity issues with other sovereigns 
and the notion that those sailing on flagless ships have forfeited protections 
under international law.115  The nexus requirement is also vitiated where a 
 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 110. Under the Charming Betsy doctrine, Congress is presumed to intend its legislation to 
comply with international law unless its intent to act otherwise is clear. Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. . . .”). 
 111. United States v. Ali, 885 F. Supp. 2d 17, 33–34 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing 
conspiracy to commit piracy charge as unfounded under international law defining universal 
jurisdiction), aff’d in part, 718 F.3d 929, 942 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 112. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Yunis, 924 
F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[The defendant] seeks to portray international law as a 
self-executing code that trumps domestic law whenever the two conflict.  That effort 
misconceives the role of judges as appliers of international law and as participants in the 
federal system.  Our duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States, not to conform the law of the land to norms of customary international law.”). 
 113. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987) (“There was substantial 
evidence that the drugs were bound ultimately for the United States.  Where an attempted 
transaction is aimed at causing criminal acts within the United States, there is a sufficient 
basis for the United States to exercise its jurisdiction to arrest and try the offenders.”). 
 114. United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (“‘In order to apply 
extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there 
must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such 
application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.’” (quoting Yousef, 327 F.3d at 
112)); Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1160-61; United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 828 
(9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]o satisfy 
the strictures of due process, the Government [must] demonstrate that there exists ‘a 
sufficient nexus between the conduct condemned and the United States such that the 
application of the statute [to the conduct of an alien committed abroad] would not be 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair to the defendant.’” (quoting United States v. Medjuck, 48 
F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995))); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
 115. United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372–73 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[W]here a 
defendant attempts to avoid the law of all nations by travelling on a stateless vessel, he has 
forfeited these protections of international law and can be charged with the knowledge that 
he has done so.”). 
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treaty obligates the United States to prosecute certain crimes,116 even if the 
alien defendant is from a nation not party to that treaty.117 
The Second Circuit has also adopted an approach reliant on a 
determination of the nexus of an offense to the United States, which is 
found whenever the activity in question is aimed at causing harm within its 
territory.118  The Fourth Circuit has followed suit.119  The nexus test is said 
to perform the same function that the minimum contacts test serves in civil 
litigation—that is, to determine whether a defendant should “reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court” in the United States.120 
Other circuits have rejected the nexus requirement and analyzed 
jurisdiction based on “fundamental fairness.”121  Some courts have 
determined fundamental fairness by inquiring whether an exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction comports with international law principles.122  
Others apparently find dispositive the possibility that a prosecution might 
impinge on the interests of a foreign state.123  In these courts, competing 
state interests apparently trump any analysis of individual rights when it 
comes to weighing fundamental fairness. 
 
 
 116. United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 723 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 117. United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (construing Shi as holding 
that an international convention provides global notice that certain generally condemned acts 
are subject to prosecution by any party to the treaty and that due process requires no more). 
 118. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118 (“When Congress so intends, we apply a statute 
extraterritorially as long as doing so does not violate due process.  ‘In order to apply 
extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there 
must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such 
application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.’  For non-citizens acting entirely 
abroad, a jurisdictional nexus exists when the aim of that activity is to cause harm inside the 
United States or to U.S. citizens or interests.” (quoting Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86)); Yousef, 327 
F.3d at 111–12. 
 119. United States v. Mohammad-Omar, 323 F. App’x 259 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 120. United States v. Klimavicius–Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the 
sufficient nexus requirement); United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 
2002) (finding that where conduct occurred on the high seas and the flag nation consents to 
jurisdiction, “no due process violation occurs in an extraterritorial prosecution under [the 
criminal statute] when there is no nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the United 
States”); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) (“To satisfy due 
process, our application of the [criminal statute] must not be arbitrary or fundamentally 
unfair.”); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting 
the sufficient nexus test and noting that there was “nothing fundamentally unfair” about the 
defendant’s prosecution). 
 122. See United States v. Ibaruen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378–79 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(finding that the exercise of jurisdiction over a stateless vessel did not offend international 
principles and therefore comported with due process); Stigall, supra note 108, at 361 (citing 
Cardales, 168 F.3d 548). 
 123. See Stigall, supra note 108, at 367 (describing the practice of the Third Circuit in 
Martinez-Hidalgo and Perez-Oviedo). 
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CONCLUSION 
As the courts inevitably confront more foreign defendants caught in the 
web of antiterrorism laws, challenges to jurisdiction on due process grounds 
will likely swell.  The Supreme Court has yet to review the doctrinal 
paradox that the Due Process Clause seems to provide the greatest 
protection to persons who are said to enjoy the fewest due process 
protections.124  Perhaps the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to reassess 
its approach in this regard. 
The Court has recently renewed its commitment to the presumption 
against extraterritoriality,125 while also embracing a more pragmatic 
approach to determining how the Constitution applies abroad.126  A return 
to historical considerations based on international law conceptions of the 
meaning of citizenship might serve to satisfy both the formalist and 
functionalist sides of the debate. 
This approach would reconnect the lost link between allegiance and 
protection that remained perceptible until the second half of the last century.  
Extraterritorial jurisdiction over an alien would be presumed reasonable in 
the case of conduct that breaches an obligation on the part of the alien or his 
state of nationality.  Such an obligation could arise from treaty or from the 
general obligation to refrain from injuring another sovereign or its 
nationals.  Most cases in which a sufficient nexus can be established under 
the current approach of some circuits would likely satisfy this requirement.  
Crimes that are subject to universal jurisdiction would continue to apply 
universally.  On the other hand, if the statute in question is more akin to a 
prohibition on trading with the enemy—in other words, where the 
government mobilizes the people to support its foreign policy—foreigners 
outside the United States would not be expected to pitch in.  Under this 
view, sanctions laws would only apply to those persons within the United 
States and to those persons abroad who purposefully avail themselves of 
U.S. markets.  This would not necessarily lessen the effectiveness of U.S. 
sanctions policies; it would merely sharpen the distinction between the 
targets of sanctions and those obliged to assist the United States in carrying 
them out.  In the case of actual hostilities, enemy individuals would not be 
expected to act as if in allegiance to the United States, but would be subject 
to greatly reduced due process in the event of a deprivation of liberty 
interest, albeit in accordance with the protections of international law. 
 
 
 124. A number of commentators have criticized this development. See, e.g., Anthony J. 
Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:  Terrorism and the 
Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121 (2007); A. Mark 
Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 379 (1997). 
 125. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 126. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
